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It is often claimed that (i) managers work too hard on operational issues
and do not spend enough effort on strategic activities and (ii) something can
be done about this by introducing nonﬁnancial performance measures as for
instance with a balanced scorecard. We give an explanation for both claims
in a formal model. The distortion towards operational effort arises, because
with ﬁnancial performance measures strategic effort can only be rewarded
in the future. But renegotiation-proof long term compensation plans entail
too weak variable components in the future. This problem can be reduced
by introducing performance measures that help to disentangle strategic and
operational effects.
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11 Introduction
It has often been claimed in the management and accounting literature as well
as in the business press1 that managers seem to be too short-term oriented, that
they neglect strategic activities and spend too much effort on improving current
results. In this paper a simple formal model is developed to provide one explana-
tion for this claim. We will argue that there is an inherent distortion in the optimal
compensation for the manager if it is only based on ﬁnancial performance mea-
sures. This distortion leads to an overprovision of effort for operational and an
underprovision of effort for strategic tasks. This is due to the following effect: the
total impact of a strategic activity can only be captured by a ﬁnancial performance
indicator after some time has passed. Financial indicators are lagging indicators
of many aspects of organizational performance. If, for instance, a manager exerts
effort to look for new business opportunities, this will positively affect ﬁnancial
indicators, like the ﬁrm’s proﬁt or cash ﬂow only after some time has elapsed.
Hence, future compensation should encompass some additional variability to pro-
vide incentives for current strategic activities. But once the effort for the strategic
activity has been exerted and, hence, the costs of this effort are sunk, both con-
tracting parties have a common interest to reduce the uncertainty in a risk averse
manager’s compensation. As this is anticipated by the manager he will underin-
vest in strategic activities. Therefore, any renegotiation-proof or time-consistent
compensation plan entails incentives that are too weak as compared to a full com-
mitment solution.
The ﬁrm may improve incentives for the strategic activity to some extend, by
raising current variable compensation. But this in turn leads to an overinvest-
ment in current operational activities, as the effects of operational and strategic
activities on current ﬁnancial indicators cannot be separated. It is exactly the last
point that indicates how this problem may be partially resolved. If there are per-
formance measures available that help to disentangle the effects of strategic and
operational activities one could hope to set appropriate incentives for both. This
1For an overview see for instance the discussion in Hauser, Simester and Wernerfelt (1994).
2may give an additional argument for the increasing importance of nonﬁnancial
performance measures in management compensation. Nonﬁnancial indicators as
for instance customer satisfaction or employee satisfaction ratings, the number
of patents awarded to a research unit and so on are useful because they may be
appropriate leading indicators of strategic performance.
We present a simple model, where a manager is employed in two periods and
spends effort on an operational and a strategic activity. Whereas the effort on the
operational activity has only an impact on current proﬁts, the effort on the strate-
gic activity also inﬂuences the next period’s results. In a ﬁrst part we assume
that proﬁt is the only performance measure on which the manager’s compensation
can be based. We start by solving for the optimal contract with full commitment.
Then we analyze the effects of a possible renegotiation of the compensation con-
tract after the ﬁrst period. We will show that both parties will agree to reduce
the variable part of the manager’s compensation in this case. Taking this into
account, we compute the optimal renegotiation-proof compensation contract, re-
stricting the analysis to contracts that implement effort choices in pure strategies.
It turns out, that as a response to reduced second period variable compensation,
the contract entails a higher variable compensation in the ﬁrst period. This is in-
deed done to mitigate the loss of strategic incentives. After the computation of the
optimal contract, we examine its effect on managerial behavior and show that an
underprovision of strategic and an overprovision of operational effort will result
in the ﬁrst period relative to the full commitment case. If the long-term return to
the strategic activity is sufﬁciently large, the manager will even spend more on the
operational activity than in the ﬁrst-best solution.
To examine more closely whether additional nonﬁnancial performance mea-
sures may help to solve this problem, we will introduce an additional signal, that
only measures the effort spent on the strategic activity. It will be constructed in
such a way that it will never receive a positive weight in the full commitment case
as it contains more noise than actual proﬁts. We then show that the measure re-
ceives a positive weight in the manager’s compensation when the contract has to
be renegotiation-proof. The typical argument given in the literature for the appli-
3cation of nonﬁnancial measures is that they might provide more information on an
agent’s action and, hence, help to reduce uncertainty and, therefore, risk premia
that have to be paid to the agent.2 We do not want to contradict this argument
but to strengthen it in one respect: Even a performance measure that will not get
a positive weight in an optimal contract with full commitment will get a positive
weight if commitment is infeasible.
There are of course other explanations for short-term orientation of managers.
Naranayan (1985) considers managerial career concerns as a reason for short-
term orientation. Stein (1989), Chen (1993) or Brandenburger and Polak (1996)
show that share price maximization distorts decision-making in publicly traded
companies.
The idea that renegotiation leads to a reduction of risk in a hidden action set-
ting has ﬁrst been analyzed by Fudenberg and Tirole (1990). They examine a
one-period hidden action model, in which the contract can be renegotiated after
the agent has chosen his unobservable effort but before the payments prescribed
by the initial contract are made. They show, that if the principal makes a take-it-
or-leave-it offer, renegotiation leads to a welfare loss.3
Distortions in performance measurement systems have been analyzed in static
multitask agency models by Feltham and Xie (1994) and Datar, Kulp and Lambert
(2001). They have stressed the importance of attaining a high congruence between
the agents compensation as determined by the performance measurement system
and the principal’s objective function for generating appropriate undistorted in-
centives. In our dynamic model we show that, although a perfectly congruent
performance measure is available—namely the principal’s proﬁt —renegotiation
2Much of the accounting literature refers to Holmstr¨ om (1979) in this respect. See also
Banker/Datar (1989), Feltham/Xie (1994) or the discussion in Injejikian (1999).
3However, the principal can implement more than the least cost action, as the agent may play
a mixed strategy and the principal can offer a menu of contracts for screening reasons, of which
one still contains some uncertainty. Ma (1994) shows that the ﬁrst-best may be attained, if the
agent makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer at the renegotiation stage. Hermalin and Katz (1991) show
that the ﬁrst-best can also be attained with renegotiation, if the agent’s action is unveriﬁable but
observable by the principal.
4limits the possibility of achieving congruence.
Other studies that analyze the combination of ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial per-
formance measures are Hemmer (1996) and Hauser, Simester and Wernerfelt
(1994). Both papers have in common with our approach that nonﬁnancial mea-
sures help to overcome incentive problems caused by an agent’s short-term orien-
tation. But whereas in those papers agents are short-term oriented by assumption4,
in our paper short-termism arises endogenously due to renegotiation of the incen-
tive contract.
Theuseofnonﬁnancialindicatorsinorganizationalperformancemeasurement
has been popularized with the concept of the Balanced Scorecard proposed by
Kaplan and Norton (1996), postulating that ﬁrms should use a balanced set of
ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial indicators to measure organizational performace. In
Kaplan and Norton (2001) the authors report case study evidence on companies
implementing explicit compensation schemes based on performance measures in
the balanced scorecard. There is some recent econometric evidence on the use
of nonﬁnancial performance measures consistent with the results of this paper.
Ittner, Larcker and Rajan (1997) examine the use of nonﬁnancial performance
measures in compensation plans by analyzing a sample of ﬁrms that explicitly de-
termine their CEO’s compensation as a function of performance measures. First
of all, 36% of the ﬁrms in their sample employ nonﬁnancial measures. Most in-
terestingly, they ﬁnd strong evidence that ﬁrms following an innovation oriented
strategy5 place a higher weight on nonﬁnancial measures in executive compensa-
tion, which is in line with our prediction, that the nonﬁnancial measure will be
used when the importance of the strategic activity is sufﬁciently large. Bushman,
IndjejikianandSmith(1996)investigatetheimportanceofindividualperformance
4Hemmer (1996) analyzes a static model, where the agent’s short-termism is modelled by
assuming that a part of the ﬁrm’s income is realized in the future and cannot be used in an incentive
contract. Hauser, Simester and Wernerfelt (1994) assume that agents have a lower discount factor
than the ﬁrm.
5As indicators for an innovation oriented strategy they apply the ratio of research and devel-
opment to sales, the market-to-book ratio, the ratio of employee to sales and the number of new
products and services.
5evaluation of CEOs in their compensation plans as opposed to performance mea-
sures at the corporate, group, divisional or plant levels. Hence, individual perfor-
manceevaluationintheirdeﬁnitioncomprisesnonﬁnancialperformancemeasures
as well as subjective performance evaluation of a CEO by the board and excludes
corporate or group proﬁts. They ﬁnd evidence that individual performance evalua-
tion increases with growth opportunities and product time horizons.6 Both factors
can be viewed as corresponding to the long-term return of the strategic activity in
our model. Banker, Potter and Srinivasan (2000) have analyzed time series data
of performance measures within a ﬁrm before and after the introduction of non-
ﬁnancial performance measures in management compensation. They ﬁnd strong
evidence for increased values of ﬁnancial as well as nonﬁnancial measures after a
hotel chain introduced explicit weights on nonﬁnancial measures in its managers’
compensation plans.7
2 The Model
We analyze in this paper a two period Holmstr¨ om/Milgrom-type or LEN model.
That is, contracts are linear, utility functions are exponential (i.e. agents have
constant absolute risk aversion) and noise terms are normally distributed.8
A manager works for a ﬁrm in two consecutive periods t ∈ {1,2}. Think
of such a period as the duration of time for which a manager’s compensation is
determined. In each period he exerts two types of effort, one on an operational
and one on a strategic activity. The effort spent on the operational activity is et,
6In their paper growth opportunities of a ﬁrm are measured by its market-to-book ratio. To
examine the impact of time horizon, Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith categorize ﬁrms into short
or long time horizon types, applying a classiﬁcation scheme for industries based on development
cycle time and product life cycle time.
7See the conclusion of this paper for an additional discussion of their results.
8See for instance Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1987, 1991), Spremann (1987). Holmstr¨ om and
Milgrom (1987) have shown that the optimality of linear contracts can be derived in a more general
setting, where an agent controls the drift rate of a stochastic process by his effort. For applications
in the area of performance measurement see for instance Feltham and Xie (1994), Datar, Kulp and
Lambert (2001), Wagenhofer (1999) or Dutta and Reichelstein (1999).
6it affects the ﬁrm’s proﬁts only in the actual period. The effort for the strategic
activity is it. Contrary to the operational effort the strategic effort in period 1 also
affects proﬁts in period 2. Think for instance of the operational effort as being
spent on tasks like short-run promotion activities or immediate cost reductions
whereas the strategic activity may contain the effort spent on ﬁnding new business
opportunities, investing in a good long-term relationship with the ﬁrm’s clients or
the own employees and so on.
The ﬁrm’s gross proﬁts πt are veriﬁable and, hence, the manager’s compensa-
tion can be based upon them. In periods 1 and 2 they are given by9
π1 = κe1 + θ1i1 + ε1 and
π2 = κe2 + θ1i2 + θ2i1 + ε2.
Hence, κ is the marginal return of effort for the operational activity, whereas θ1,θ2
determine the marginal return proﬁle of the strategic activity in both periods. That
is, each unit of strategic effort spent in period 1 gives the ﬁrm a return of θ1 in
period 1 and θ2 in period 2. All marginal returns are assumed to be positive. In
addition, total proﬁts in each period are also affected by some random noise term
εt. We assume that ε1 and ε2 are stochastically independent with identical normal
distribution with variance σ2 and zero mean. In the ﬁrst part of the paper gross
proﬁts are the only available performance measure.
The manager’s costs for the two activities are given by a simple additively












Hence, the marginal costs for one activity are not affected by the effort spent on
the other activity. The manager has a utility function with constant absolute risk
aversion, which for income wt and effort costs ct in periods 1 and 2 is given by
u(w1 − c1,w2 − c2) = −exp(−r(w1 − c1)) − δ exp(−r(w2 − c2)),
9It has been shown that the key results of this paper continue to hold in an example with a
technology where strategic and operational efforts are perfect complements. The formal analysis
of this example can be requested from the author. I thank an anonymous referee for pointing in
that direction.
7where r is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. Future utility is
discounted by the manager with a factor δ ∈ (0,1]. Furthermore, we assume
that he has unrestricted access to the capital market, hence, he can borrow or
lend money to smooth his consumption. In each period he has a deterministic
reservation income of ¯ w.
Themanager’scompensationislinearinﬁrstandsecondperiodproﬁts. Hence,
a long-term contract speciﬁes a ﬁxed wage αt for each period and a variable bonus
coefﬁcient βt. The manager’s income in period t is then10
wt = αt + βtπt. (1)
As usual the ﬁrm is supposed to be risk neutral and we assume that it discounts
future proﬁts at the same rate δ as the agent. Total net proﬁts of the ﬁrm are then
given by
Π = π1 − w1 + δ (π2 − w2). (2)
If both parties can commit to a long-term contract, the manager’s compensation
is now determined by maximizing Π taking into account the manager’s optimal
effort choice given his compensation package and a participation constraint.
We impose the additional assumption that the agent is inﬁnitely lived after
the end of the contract and still consumes his savings over time. Due to this
assumption, theexponentialutilityfunction, normalityofnoisetermsandlinearity
of the manager’s compensation as well as the unrestricted access to the capital








w1 − c1 −
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
.
10Note that there is no need to make second period compensation contingent on ﬁrst period
proﬁt: As ﬁrm and agent discount with the same factor and the agent has unrestricted access to the
capital market at a corresponding interest rate, the same effect can be attained by increasing ﬁrst
period variable compensation β1.
11V [w1] denotes the variance of wt. For the proof of this result see Dutta and Reichelstein
(1999) or Sliwka (2000) .
8Hence, utility of different uncertain income streams of an agent can be compared
simply by comparing the expression in square brackets. A mean-variance formu-
lation for an intertemporal certainty equivalent of the agent’s utility is obtained.
This, in a way extends the well known results for the static model. Note that here
the agent’s risk premia are multiplied by (1 − δ). The agent is less risk averse, as
he can smooth consumption over time.
3 The Optimal Long-term Contract
In this section we derive the optimal contract when the ﬁrm and the manager can
commit to a long-term compensation scheme and will not renegotiate this scheme
after the end of the ﬁrst period. First, as a benchmark we compute the ﬁrst-best
strategic and operational effort levels in both periods. To obtain those we simply
maximize the expected sum of discounted gross proﬁts π1 + δπ2 minus the costs
of effort, that is
max
e1,i1,e2,i2

























Due to our simple speciﬁcation of the cost function this yields the following opti-












First-best operational effort simply corresponds to the marginal return to opera-
tional effort, ﬁrst-best strategic effort to its discounted sum of marginal returns in
both periods.
To obtain the second-best long-term contract, we have to consider the man-
ager’s incentive compatibility and participation constraints. In each period the
manager maximizes his expected utility for a given compensation scheme. Note
that the effort choice has no impact on the uncertainty of the manager’s income.
9Hence, in the second period he simply solves
max
e2,i2













Of course, at this point in time the ﬁrst period strategic effort i1 is already given.
Due to the linear formulation of the model the size of i1 has no impact on second
period effort choices. In the ﬁrst period, however, the agent takes into account the
effect of his strategic effort choice on the expected second period compensation.
Hence, he maximizes the following function:
max
e1,i1






























The solution of these equations gives us the following incentive compatibility










1 = κβ1 and (IC1)
i
∗
1 = θ1β1 + δθ2β2.
Furthermore, the principal has to take into account that the manager’s total ex-
pected utility must exceed the utility of his reservation wage, that is the expres-
sion in square brackets in (3) has to be greater or equal than the discounted sum
of the manager’s reservation wage given by (1 + δ) ¯ w. As usual the participation
constraint must hold with equality. Otherwise, the ﬁxed wages αt could be re-
duced without violating any constraint and this would raise the principal’s utility.
Hence, one can solve for the discounted sum of ﬁxed wages αt and substitute this
in the principal’s objective function (2). Similar to the static model, the princi-
pal’s objective function is equal to the total expected surplus less the risk premia
that have to be paid to the agent. The optimal bonus coefﬁcients β1 and β2 are ob-
tained by maximizing this objective function subject to the incentive compatibility
10constraints (IC1) and (IC2), that is






































































2 + (1 − δ)rσ2 .
There is always underinvestment in strategic and operational effort in the ﬁrst
period.
Proof: See Appendix.
For the explicit solution for the two coefﬁcients also refer to the Appendix.
We only give the equations (5) here, as these are more directly interpretable. First,
note that both bonus rates are partial substitutes, both can in principle be used to
augment the incentives for the strategic task in period 1, as effort for this task
affects ﬁrst and second period gross proﬁts. This can be directly seen from equa-
tions (5). The optimal ﬁrst period rate β
∗
1 is decreasing in β
∗
2 as well as vice-versa.
The higher the second period rate, the lower can be the ﬁrst period rate to elicit
appropriate incentives for the strategic activity. Furthermore, note that this is only
true if the strategic effort has an impact on ﬁrst and second period proﬁts, i.e. θ1
and θ2 are both strictly positive. Otherwise the rates for both periods are set in-
dependently. In addition, note that if β
∗
2 had the value one for some reason, the
expression for β
∗
1 would be completely independent from the value of θ2. If ﬁrst-
best incentives are set for the second period consequences of the manager’s effort
11choice, the ﬁrst period rate is only determined by ﬁrst period incentive considera-
tions.
The underinvestment result is of course due to the manager’s risk aversion.
For small values of the Arrow-Pratt-measure of absolute risk aversion r the bonus
rates β1 and β2 tend to one, therefore both strategic and operational efforts tend
to the ﬁrst-best values. For r = 0 the ﬁrst-best efforts are achieved.
Feltham and Xie (1994) for a single performance measure and Datar, Kulp
and Lambert (2001) for multiple measures have stressed that one important aspect
which has to be considered when designing an optimal incentive scheme is the
congruity12 between the total outcome and the agent’s compensation. As Da-
tar, Kulp and Lambert (2001) argue, congruence can be raised if the weights for
different performance measures in the agent’s compensation can be adapted in
such a way to replicate the effect of his actions on the total outcome. If we transfer
their idea to the dynamic case considered in our paper there are two performance
measures (ﬁrst and second period proﬁts) and the outcome is just the discounted
sum of both proﬁts. Therefore, perfect congruity is achieved if full commitment is
feasible. In this sense proﬁt does not perform too bad as a performance measure
if both parties can commit to a long-term compensation package. The agent’s
variable compensation in the future is determined taking into account the effect
on strategic effort in the preceding period. By exerting more effort on strategic
activities in the present, the manager increases future proﬁts and he knows that he
will get an appropriate share of those proﬁts. But, if both parties are not able to
commit to a long-term compensation scheme, this picture changes as we will see
in the next section.
12Datar, Kulp and Lambert (2001) propose the sum of squared distances between the slope
of the ﬁrm’s outcome and the slope of the agent’s compensation with respect to his actions as a
measure of non-congruity.
124 On the Negligence of Strategic Activities
4.1 Reducing Variable Compensation
Nowconsiderthesituationinwhichthemanagerhassignedthelong-termcontract
as described in the previous section. Suppose that, at the beginning of period
2, both parties reconsider the compensation scheme. Note that the value of β
∗
2,
the manager’s second period variable compensation, is partly explained by its
incentiveeffectonﬁrstperiodstrategiceffort. Butthemanagerhasalreadyexerted
his ﬁrst period strategic and operational efforts and the costs for both are sunk.
So, why not reduce β
∗
2 to some extend, taking only into account its effect on
secondperiodincentives?Themanagercanbecompensatedforhislossinvariable
compensation by a higher ﬁxed payment. As he is risk averse this should lead to
a Pareto-improvement.
We restrict the analysis to equilibria in pure strategies and assume that the
principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent at the beginning of period
2. To see the impact of renegotiations formally, consider the total surplus created
in the second period, given that the ﬁrst period strategic effort has been i∗
1:



















Now, of course, the ﬁrst period incentive constraints can be ignored and only the
second period incentive constraints have to be taken into account to determine
the optimal value of β2. Recall that they are given by e2 = κβ2 and i2 = θ1β2.
Solving this program yields the following result:
Lemma 1 If both parties can adapt the compensation scheme before the begin-
ning of period 2, they will change the second period variable compensation. The
optimal variable compensation rate in period 2 of any renegotiation-proof con-









1 + r(1 − δ)σ2. (6)
It is smaller than the bonus rate β
∗
2 with full commitment.
13Proof: See Appendix.
To give an intuition for this result we separate the total effect of a change in
β2 into its impact on incentives on the one hand, and on the risk premium on
the other hand. As long as there is underinvestment in strategic effort—which is
always the case as we have seen in Proposition 1—the marginal impact of β2 on
incentives is positive. Furthermore, from the perspective of period 1 the marginal
impact of β2 on incentives is composed of its effect on second period as well as
ﬁrst period effort. But from the perspective of period 2 only its effect on second
period incentives matters. Hence, the marginal return on the incentive side from
an increased β2 is lower from the perspective of period 2. On the other hand,
the marginal cost due to a higher risk premium for the uncertainty from β2 is
unchanged. Therefore, the variable compensation will be reduced in the second
period.13
Clearly, this has an impact on ﬁrst period incentives of the manager. As he
will get a smaller variable compensation in period 2 we should expect, that he
will exert less effort on strategic activities. But the principal will of course antici-
pate renegotiation and adapt the ﬁrst period contract and take into account those
effects. To see how the ﬁrst period contracting changes when the parties may
change the compensation plan after the ﬁrst period, we now look for the optimal
renegotiation-proof long-term contract. Therefore program (4) has to be solved
with an additional renegotiation-proofness condition which boils down to impos-
ing that β2 = β
R
2 . This yields the following result:14
13Note that we restricted the analysis to a pure strategy equilibrium. Hence, the agent and
the principal both know in equilibrium the ﬁrst period strategic effort exerted by the agent. If
mixed strategy equilibria were taken into account, the negotiations before period 2 would be under
asymmetic information, as the principal would not know the effort exerted by the agent in the ﬁrst
period. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) for a model where mixed strategy equilibria are taken
into account and, hence, renegotiation under asymmetric information is analyzed.
14Again, we give the explicit value of β
R





2 given here is more directly interpretable.
14Proposition 2 In the optimal renegotiation-proof contract the ﬁrst and second pe-























1 + r(1 − δ)σ2.
The second period variable compensation is lower, the ﬁrst period variable com-
pensation is higher than in the full-commitment case.
Proof: See Appendix.
Note that for a given β2 the choice of β1 is unaffected by the renegotiation
possibility: The expression for β
R
1 in (7) as a function of β2 corresponds exactly
to the expression for the long-term contracting case in (5). As we have seen in the
preceeding section, the present and future variable compensation rates β1 and β2
are (of course imperfect) substitutes for generating strategic incentives: the opti-
mal value of β1 is a decreasing function of β2. It becomes immediately clear from
this fact, that the ﬁrm will respond to reduced second period variable compensa-
tion by increasing the ﬁrst period rate. This will partially compensate for the loss
in strategic incentives.
But certainly this comes at a cost. A higher value of the present variable
compensation not only increases incentives for the strategic, but also those for the
current operational activity. Those two effects cannot be disentangled, hence, a
distortion in the incentive system will arise.
4.2 Managerial Behaviour
We can now examine the effects of the reduction of future variable compensation
on the manager’s behaviour. To do this we have to insert the optimal values for
the variable compensation rates into the agent’s reaction function given in the
15incentive compatibility conditions (IC1) and (IC2). Recall that the manager’s
effort choice is determined by
e2 = κβ2,
i2 = θ1β2,
e1 = κβ1 and
i1 = θ1β1 + δθ2β2.
First of all, it is clear that the second period efforts for the strategic as well as
the operational activity are reduced, as β
R
2 is smaller than β
∗
2. More interesting
are the effects on ﬁrst period incentives. As we have seen above, the ﬁrst period
variable compensation β1 is increased, hence the manager will exert more effort
on the operational activity as the choice of e1 only depends on β1. The effect on
the strategic activity cannot be directly seen from the equation above. On the one
hand, β2 and therefore the future return to effort for strategic activities is lower.
On the other hand, the present return determined by β1 is increased. We show in
the Appendix that the second effect is always dominated by the ﬁrst. First, we
want to state a result which summarizes those considerations. After that we give
some additional intuition for these claims.
Corollary 1 Therenegotiation-proofcompensationschemehasthefollowingprop-
erties
(i) There will be lower second period efforts than in the full-commitment case.
(ii) In the ﬁrst period there is always an overprovision of operational and under-
provision of strategic effort relative to the full-commitment case.
(iii) The manager will spend a higher operational effort than in the ﬁrst-best so-
lution if and only if the long-term return to strategic activities θ2 is larger than a
certain cut-off value.
Proof: The proofs of claim (i) and the ﬁrst part of claim (ii) follow from the text.
For the other claims see the Appendix.
16The only reason for an increased value of the variable compensation in the
present (β
R
1 ) is that stronger incentives for the strategic activity have to be gener-
ated to compensate for the reduction of the variable compensation in the future.
But those additional strategic incentives come at a cost: operational incentives are
also strengthened, which will lead to a distortion. Given the renegotiated rate,
generating additional incentives for the strategic activity with a higher β1 is more
costly than would be with a higher β2 due to that distortion (Otherwise the optimal
long-term contract would have done it that way). Hence, generating incentives for
the strategic activity is more expensive when renegotiation takes place. Conse-
quently a lower strategic effort level will be implemented.
Nonetheless, the ﬁrst period variable compensation may be raised to such an
extend that the agent exerts even more operational effort than the ﬁrst-best level.
This will happen if the long-term return to strategic effort is sufﬁciently large. The
larger this strategic return, the more harmful is the loss in strategic incentives due
to weak second period variable compensation. And this can—as we have seen—
only be compensated by raising variable compensation in the ﬁrst period which
will also raise operational effort.
As we have discussed above, with full commitment the principal has two de-
grees of freedom to attain a high congruence of the performance measurement
system with the total payoffs, namely the ﬁrst and second period variable com-
pensation rates. When renegotiation-proof contracts have to be considered, how-
ever, the contract choice is restricted as the second period variable rate has to be
taken as given. Hence, the possibilities to increase congruence are limited for the
principal and the incentive system will be distorted.
5 Nonﬁnancial Performance Measures
It may now be asked what can be done to overcome this problem. Recall that the
reason for a distortion in ﬁrst period incentives is that the effects of strategic and
operational effort cannot be disentangled, when the manager’s compensation is
based only on proﬁts. This does not pose a large problem, when full commitment
17to a long-term compensation plan is feasible, as the manager can be compensated
appropriately in the future. But if this is not the case, and such a plan can—and as
wehaveshownabovewillindeed—beadaptedinthefuture, proﬁtaloneseemsnot
to be an appropriate performance measure. We should expect, that the situation
can be improved if the manager’s compensation can be made contingent on other
performance measures that help to disentangle the management’s strategic and
operational efforts.
To examine whether this is indeed the case, we assume that there is an addi-
tional performance measure available in the ﬁrst period which is only affected by
the manager’s effort on strategic activities. This may for instance be a combina-
tion of different nonﬁnancial measures like the number of new product launches,
the number of patents awarded or similar indicators of strategic performance. We
assume that such a measure can only get a positive weight in the agent’s compen-
sation. This assumption can be justiﬁed, if the agent can always manipulate such a
measure downwards, which seems a quite reasonable assumption for nonﬁnancial
performance indicators.15
Let the additional performance measure be given by
s1 = θ1i1 + µ.
Of course, if it had a smaller variance or was independent from ﬁrst period proﬁts,
it would come at no surprise that the measure is useful. Therefore, we assume that
the noise term µ is just a weakly “noisier” version of ε1, that is µ = ε1 +τ, where
τ ∼ N (0,σ2
τ) with σ2
τ ≥ 0. Let γ be the bonus coefﬁcient for the new signal. The
agent’s compensation is now given by
w1 = α1 + β1π1 + γs1,
w2 = α2 + β2π2.
The only incentive compatibility condition that changes when we introduce the
15For some types of non-ﬁnancial measures it may be the case that they can be manipulated by
the principal and hence, are unveriﬁable. Then of course a commitment problem exists. A formal
analysis of such a situation is for instance given in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) or Schmidt
and Schnitzer (1995).
18additional measure is of course that for the ﬁrst period strategic effort i1. This
condition, i.e. the value for effort i1 given the contract, is
i1 = θ1 (β1 + γ) + δθ2β2. (8)
There are now three levers to inﬂuence ﬁrst period strategic activity: the bonus
coefﬁcients for ﬁrst and second period proﬁts and the coefﬁcient for the strategic
performance measure. First, we will show, that this measure will not be used in
the full commitment case. After that, we demonstrate why it may be used if the
manager’s compensation is renegotiated.
Proposition 3 In the optimal long-term contract the additional strategic perfor-
mance measure will not get a positive weight in the agent’s compensation.
Proof: See Appendix.
To understand why this is the case, note that a change in either γ or β1 has
an identical effect on ﬁrst period strategic effort. Suppose now that γ would be
positive. Then, one could reduce it and raise β1 by the same amount. The risk
premium will be weakly lower as proﬁts are by assumption less noisy than the
new signal. Strategic incentives remain unchanged, but operational incentives are
higher, because γ has no effect on e1 but a higher β1 leads to higher operational
effort. As long as there is underinvestment in operational effort, this is a good
thing. And, as we have seen before, indeed there is underinvestment in the full
commitment case.16
Hence, it can never be optimal to give a positive weight to the additional signal
if the compensation plan is not renegotiated. Effort for strategic activities will be
16Note that our assumption that γ has to be nonnegative is of importance. If negative values for
γ were possible, it might be optimal set γ to a negative value. To see this consider the following:
assume a situation in which γ = 0. Reduce γ by an inﬁnitesimal amount and increase β1 instead
by the same amount. The risk premia remain unchanged as the ﬁrst derivative of the risk premium
with respect to γ is zero at γ = 0, i1 also remains unchanged but e1 increases. As long as e1 is
smaller than the ﬁrst-best, this raises total surplus. A negative value of γ would, hence, allow to
increase the incentives for the operational task.
19rewarded by an appropriate share of future proﬁts in this case. Hence, the com-
pensation plan is not distorted towards a higher current variable compensation,
possibly yielding an overprovision of operational effort. Proﬁt alone is therefore
an appropriate performance measure.
As we have seen, this may not be the case in a renegotiation-proof compensa-
tion plan. Recall that the possibility of renegotiation introduces a distortion: We
have shown that if the future return to the strategic activity θ2 is large there will
be overinvestment in operational effort relative to the ﬁrst-best. A performance
measure that is available already in the ﬁrst period and yields information on the
agent’s strategic effort alone might therefore be useful. The reduction in second
period return to the strategic activity due to renegotiation can be compensated by
raising the weight on this new measure without affecting the incentives for oper-
ational activities. And indeed, the additional performance measure will become
useful in that case as we show with the following result:
Proposition 4 If the contract is renegotiated the additional strategic performance
measure gets a positive weight in the agent’s compensation if and only if the long-
term return to strategic effort θ2 is larger than a certain cut-off value.
Proof: See Appendix.
AswehaveseeninCorollary1, withrenegotiationthereispossiblyoverinvest-
ment in operational effort. This overinvestment can be reduced without sacriﬁcing
too much strategic incentives, if γ is raised and β1 is lowered. Such a change in
the compensation plan may induce higher risk costs, but will lead to a smaller
distortion. The higher the long-term impact of strategic effort θ2, the higher is
the extend of overinvestment in operational effort as we have shown in Corollary
1. Hence, for high values of θ2 it will become beneﬁcial to base the manager’s
compensation also on the additional strategic performance measure.
206 Conclusion
As we have pointed out, variable compensation for a manager based on ﬁnancial
results serves two purposes: ﬁrst of all it provides incentives for the manager to
exert a higher effort in the future. But in addition, it also rewards the manager’s
performance in the past, as the strategic components of his performance are only
captured by ﬁnancial indicators after some time has passed. Our model indicated
that there is an inherent tendency to neglect the latter purpose. If a manager is risk
averse, the contemporaneously optimal variable compensation is set only taking
into account its effect on future incentives.
As we have shown, this leads to a distortion in the incentive system. However,
this distortion is mitigated when additional nonﬁnancial measures can be used in
the incentive contract. In particular such additional measures become valuable
if the long-term impact of a strategic task is sufﬁciently high. This prediction is
in line with the empirical studies cited in the introduction, giving evidence that
nonﬁnancial measures are much more important in ﬁrms following an innovation
oriented strategy or having larger growth opportunities.
In their recent investigation of time-series data from a hotel chain that changed
its compensation plan by including nonﬁnancial performance measures Banker,
Potter and Srinivasan (2000) ﬁnd that this lead to improved nonﬁnancial as well
as ﬁnancial performance indicators. Furthermore, nonﬁnancial indicators such as
customer satisfaction are leading indicators (with a lag of six month in the exam-
ined case) of ﬁnancial measures. The authors raise the question why managers
did “not exert the appropriate effort to improve customer satisfaction” (Banker,
Potter and Srinivasan (2000), p. 89) before the nonﬁnancial measures have been
included in the compensation plan. This would as well have raised proﬁts and,
hence, future compensation. An explanation given in their paper is that managers,
although being aware of the relationship, did not know either its timing or magni-
tude. Our paper suggests a different explanation: the extent of the bonus payment
conditional on ﬁnancial performance only may have simply been too small to pro-
vide the appropriate incentives. As we have seen in our model this underprovision
of incentives results if the compensation plan is based only on the ﬁnancial mea-
21sure and has to be time-consistent. This commitment problem can be solved by
including nonﬁnancial measures in the manager’s compensation.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
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22As the expression in brackets is always positive, the left hand side is clearly neg-
ative which establishes the claim.
To see whether there is also underinvestment in operational effort, we have to
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and this completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1:
First, substitute the second period incentive constraints in the expression for the
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23Clearly, it can never be the case that a long-term contract, that should not be rene-
gotiated after period 1, encompasses a second period variable compensation dif-
ferent from β
R
2 . There would always be the possibility of a Pareto-improvement,
as β
R
2 is deﬁned as the variable rate that maximizes total surplus in the begin-
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But this can be re-arranged and we get the equivalent condition
θ2 (1 − δ)r
 
rθ2σ
4δ (1 − δ) + rθ1σ









which is clearly always the case.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The total surplus is maximized taking into account the renegotiation-proofness
constraint, which deﬁnes the only feasible value of β2. Again we can substitute
the effort choices resulting from the incentive constraints into the expression for
the total surplus (4) and get (9), with the only difference that we maximize only









1 + r(1 − δ)σ2.
The ﬁrst-order condition for β1 of course then corresponds to the one obtained in
the proof of Proposition 1, namely (10). Hence, we have the identical expression
for β1 as a function of β2, which is given in the ﬁrst part of (5). But this is clearly









1. Finally, substituting β
R
2 in the equation for β
R
1 in (7) yields the
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24Proof of Corollary 1:
For the last part of claim (ii) that the ﬁrst period strategic effort is lower when the
contract is renegotiated consider the following. For a given β2 and an optimally
adapted β1 the effort for the ﬁrst period strategic activity is given by:




1 + κ2 + δθ1θ2 (1 − β2)
θ
2
1 + κ2 + r(1 − δ)σ2 + δθ2β2.
We show, that this function is increasing in β2. As β
R
2 is smaller than β
∗
2 this will
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This is clearly always the case. Hence, a reduced second period return to strategic
effort is not fully compensated by a resulting adaption of the ﬁrst period return.
We show claim (iii), i.e. that ﬁrst period operational effort will be larger than
the ﬁrst-best level if and only if θ2 is larger than a certain cut-off value by checking
that β
R
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25The right hand side yields the cut-off value for θ2.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The contracting problem is now as follows
max
β1,β2,γ,e1,e2,i1,i2













































i1 = θ1β1 + δθ2β2 + θ1γ,
e2 = κβ2,
i2 = θ1β2 and
γ ≥ 0.
We can substitute again the incentive constraints directly into the objective func-





s.t. γ ≥ 0.









the incentive coefﬁcients that are optimal in the full commitment case. Note that
S is concave as it is the sum of concave functions. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions—

























26Clearly, conditions (13) and (14) hold at the proposed solution, as they then cor-











2 (1 − β1) + r(1 − δ)γσ
2
τ. (15)
The difference of the marginal impacts of γ and β1 consists of two parts. First,
β1 inﬂuences the operational in addition to the strategic effort. Second, γ encom-
passes a higher risk premium. From condition (13) we have that ∂S/∂β1 = 0.
Solving for ∂S/∂γ and substituting this in condition (12), we must have that
−κ
2 (1 − β
∗
1) ≤ 0.
As we have seen in Proposition 1, β
∗





2, γ = 0 is indeed the optimal solution.
Proof of Proposition 4:
We proceed similar to the proof of Proposition 3, but now show that γ will be
larger than 0 if and only if θ2 is larger than a cut-off value. When the contract is
renegotiated β2 will always be equal to β
R









s.t. γ ≥ 0.
If the solution to this program entails γ = 0 we must have that β1 = β
R
1 as this
results from the ﬁrst-order conditions for this case. Furthermore, the Kuhn-Tucker










































27but this is the case if and only if β
R
1 ≥ 1 which is analogous to θ2 beeing larger
than a cut-off value as we have shown in claim (iii) of Corollary 1.
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